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Respondents Beaver Creek Coal Co. and CIGNA Insurance
Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Beaver Creek")
hereby file their Response to Petitioner's Petition for Review on
appeal to this Court from the Industrial Commission.

The

Industrial Commission denied Petitioner's Motion for Review of
the administrative law judge's Order denying Petitioner's claim
for workers' compensation benefits.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-82.53(2) (1988),
35-1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988) and
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Beaver Creek submits that the issues on appeal and the
standards of appellate review are as follows:
(1)

Whether Petitioner's work activities on April 15,

1988 were the medical cause of his disability.1
Petitioner argues that the issue is whether a compensable
accident occurred. This misses the point, the Industrial
Commission's decision turns upon the finding of no medical
causation between the April 15, 1988 events and his disability.
The Administrative Law Judge's order specifically does not reach
the issue of legal causation, and that non-determination cannot
be reviewed on appeal. Accordingly, a finding of a compensable
accident cannot be made because the ALJ and the Commission did
not make all the factual determinations necessary for an award of
benefits. The ALJ and the Commission only made factual findings
1

The proper standard of review of this question is the
"substantial evidence" test because medical causation is a
factual issue.

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d

63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).

The administrative law judge ("ALJ")

and the Industrial Commission (the "Commission") found that
Petitioner's disability was not medically caused by his April 15,
1988 work activities.

(R. at 26). Petitioner claims, without

support, that a "correction of error" standard should be used,
but this Court has held that whether a disability is medically
the result of a work-related activity is a question of fact.
Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991).
The proper standard of review for questions of fact is the
"substantial evidence" test.

Johnson v. Board of Review, 198

Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. 1992).

Findings of fact are

affirmed if they are "supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court."

Id.,

citing Stewart v, Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.
1992) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(4)(g)

(1989)).

"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but

necessary to support the finding of no medical causation and, as
this was fatal to Petition's claim, no other findings were
necessary. At most, the claim could be sent back for further
proceedings, but that is not necessary in this case.
2

less than the weight of the evidence."

Grace Drilling, P.2d 776

at 68.
(2)

Whether the Industrial Commission applied the

correct standard of proof to Petitioner's claim.2
As this issue is a question of law, the standard of
appellate review is "correction of error."

Mor-Flo Industries v.

Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991).
(3)

Whether the Industrial Commission abused its

discretion by failing to convene a Medical Panel.
The standard of review of this issue is "abuse of
discretion."

The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that, in some

cases, failure to convene a medical panel is an "abuse of
discretion."

Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission,

703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985).

This Court also applied an abuse

of discretion standard when reviewing whether the ALJ should have
referred the medical causation issue to a medical panel.

Workers

Comp Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah App.
1988).

Petitioner argues that the issue is what standard the ALJ
applied, but it is the Commission's order which is being
reviewed, and that is the only relevant inquiry.
3

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statutes and Rule are determinative in
this appeal:
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77 (1988), Utah Code
Annotated Section 63-46(b)-16(4)(g) (1988) and Utah
Administrative Code R490-1-9.

The determinative statutes and

rules are fully set forth in Exhibit A of the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner seeks review of the Commission's Order
denying his Motion for Review of the ALJ's denial of workers'
compensation benefits.

The ALJ denied workers' compensation

benefits on the grounds that Plaintiff's work activities were
not the medical cause of his disability.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Petitioner applied for permanent total disability
compensation benefits claiming that he suffered an industrial
accident on April 15, 1988 which caused or contributed to his
disability from degenerative osteoarthritis (R. 8). Beaver Creek
submits that Petitioner's disability was not caused by an
industrial accident, but was solely due to a preexisting
condition and, therefore, that Petitioner is not entitled to
permanent total disability benefits.
4

A hearing before an ALJ was held on February 26, 1991.
(R. at 19). The ALJ found that Petitioner's back condition was
not caused by his work activity but was the result of
degenerative osteoarthritis and disc disease.

(R. 26). The ALJ

dismissed Petitioner's claim with prejudice and Petitioner filed
a Motion for Review with the Commission.

On February 18, 1992,

the Commission denied Petitioner's Motion for Review, finding
that Petitioner's medical problems were preexisting, that no
credible medical evidence conflicted with that determination, and
that the ALJ did not err.

(R. 107).

Statement of Facts
Petitioner's medical records show a history of back
problems beginning in 1970.

In 1970 Petitioner was injured while

working for a coal company in Colorado when he stooped to pick up
a cable and was unable to straighten up.

(R. 20).

Petitioner

experienced right leg pain following this incident and, in August
of 1971, he underwent back surgery, a lumbar laminectomy, which,
according to Petitioner, eliminated the right leg pain.

(R. 20).

According to his medical records, Petitioner next
sought medical attention for back problems on July 8, 1983.

On

that day, Petitioner went to Emery Medical Center complaining of
back pain, bilateral shoulder pain and left hip pain.
73).

The attending physician took X-rays and diagnosed
5

(R. A-7 at

Petitioner with severe osteoarthritis and degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine.

(R. A-7 at 73).

Petitioner was next treated for back problems on
January 16, 1988. On that day, Petitioner was at home hanging a
ceiling fan when the ladder on which he was standing collapsed
and he fell.

(R. 20). Petitioner went to see Dr. Faust and was

diagnosed with thoraco-cervical strain/sprain; grade II 9
intervertebral disc syndrome C-5, C-6 with brachial extension
neuralgia of the right shoulder and arm as a direct complication.
(R. A-8 at 169). Petitioner was treated by Dr. Faust eight times
in January 1988, seven times in February 1988, and four times in
March 1988.

(R. 20). Petitioner testified that Dr. Faust

treated only his shoulders and neck.

(R. 20).

Petitioner claims his next bout with back pain occurred
at work for Beaver Creek Coal Co. on April 15, 1988.

Petitioner

testified at the hearing before the ALJ that he experienced back
pain as a result of jerking a 20-25 pound wire mesh screen off a
stack, but there is no mention in the record of any such screen
jerking incident until the 1991 hearing before the ALJ.

The ALJ

found that the screen jerking testimony was not credible.

Dr.

Konrad P. Kotrady, M.D. treated Petitioner on the day of the
industrial incident but Dr. Kotrady's records say nothing of the
alleged screen jerking.

(R. A-2 at 9).
6

Dr. Kotrady's records

instead state that Petitioner was walking and climbing up and
down the belt drive when he experienced pain.

(R. A-2 at 9) .

Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner also treated Petitioner after
the April 15, 1988 incident, but their records say nothing about
screen jerking.

Dr. Heiner's records say that Petitioner

experienced right hip pain on April 15, 1988 while re-guarding a
belt drive which required Petitioner to climb, reach and stretch.
(R. A-6 at 63). Petitioner experienced back pain on April 23,
1988 and was admitted to Castleview Hospital.

The Castleview

records state that Petitioner was climbing up and down a drive
taking long steps when there "was a twisting type motion which
grabbed at his back, leg and right hip," but say nothing about
screen jerking.

(R. A-4 at 22). Finally, there is not even any

mention of the alleged screen jerking incident in the form which
Petitioner completed for his attorney in August of 1988 or in his
application for hearing.

(R. 8, 25).

The ALJ dismissed Petitioner's testimony regarding the
screen jerking and found by a preponderance of the evidence that
on April 15, 1988, Petitioner experienced hip pain while
re-guarding the belt drive with 20-25 pound wire mesh guards
which involved climbing, stretching, reaching and possibly
twisting.

(R. 25, 107).

7

After leaving work on April 15, 1988, Petitioner went
to Emery Medical Center and was treated by Dr. Kotrady.

Dr.

Kotrady diagnosed Petitioner with right hip pain, severe
degenerative arthritis in the hips, pelvic and lumbar spine,
degenerative disc disease in all levels of the lumbar spine and
scoliosis.

(R. A-2 at 9-10) . Dr. Kotrady completed a

Physician's Initial Report in which he marked both the "yes" and
the "no" box in answer to the question, "Is condition requiring
treatment the result of the industrial injury or exposure
described?"

(R. A-2 at 12). In the Remarks section of the

Physician's Initial Report, Dr. Kotrady wrote, "Degenerative
arthritis and disc disease pre-existing the injury.
evidence in 1983."

X-ray

(R. A-2 at 12). Dr. Kotrady's follow-up

notes state that Petitioner had full range of motion in his back
and that his assessment was ligamentitus strain of the right hip,
but no back involvement.

(R. A-2 at 8).

Petitioner was later seen by Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner.
Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner each completed a one-page, fill-in-theblank "Summary of Medical Record Form" which had been provided by
Petitioner's attorney.

(R. A-5 at 46, A-6 at 60). The doctors

completed the fill-in-the-blank form in September of 1988 and
there is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has been rated
since that time.

Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner each gave a
8

disability rating for Petitioner, without explanation or
reference to the AMA Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment, and each attributed half of the rating to the
April 15, 1988 incident.

However, neither of them had access to

Petitioner's prior medical records when they rated him.

(R. 24).

Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's Summary of Medical Record Forms are
attached hereto as Exhibits B and C.
Despite his rating that one-half of Petitioner's
disability was due to the April 15th incident, Dr. Heiner
diagnosed Petitioner with severe degenerative arthritis of the
lumbosacral spine.

(R. A-5 at 50). Dr. Heiner's September 26,

1989 notes indicate that Petitioner's condition is unpredictable
because severe pain bouts can occur just from walking, sitting or
standing, but pain most often occurs when Petitioner twists or
turns.

(R. A-5 at 51). Dr. Heiner's medical notes also reveal

that Petitioner experienced severe back pain on July 7, 1988
while washing two cars (R. A-5 at 61) and on April 21, 1989 when
he fell while attempting to hang Christmas lights. (R. A-5 at
52).
Dr. Gaufin saw Petitioner on May 5, 1988, and his
impression of Petitioner was acute lumbar radiculopathy L4-5,
L3-4, right, secondary to degenerative disc and joint disease
with disc protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right greater than left, and
9

chronic osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease and joint
disease, Ll-2, L2-3, L3-4, L4-5, L5-S1 bilaterally.
66).

(R. A-6 at

Dr. Gaufin's December 21, 1988 impression of Petitioner is

acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary to degenerative
disc and joint disease.

(R. A-6 at 58.)

Finally, Dr. Gaufin

comments in a December 21, 1988 letter that Petitioner has a
permanent disability, and will be unable to work in the future
because of a severe degenerative process of the lumbar spine.
(R. A-6 at 58.)

Dr. Gaufin also comments in that letter that his

goal is to reduce the rate at which the joints in Petitioner's
lower back wear out and, hopefully, minimize severe crippling
effects which might occur.

(R. A-6 at 59).

After reviewing the medical records and conducting a
hearing, the ALJ determined that Petitioner's disability was due
to a preexisting condition and that Petitioner did not prove that
any incident on April 15, 1988 caused his disability.

(R. 26).

The ALJ noted that Dr. Kotrady was of the opinion that
Petitioner's back problems were preexisting.

(R. 25). Dr.

Kotrady's explanation of the hip pain was arthritis of the hip
joints, confirmed by X-ray, which he believed was caused by
Petitioner shifting weight from his bad back to his hip.
(R. 25). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Kotrady was unable to give
a definitive yes to whether the industrial injury caused
10

Petitioner's pain.

(R. 25). The ALJ emphasized that Dr. Kotrady

diagnosed Petitioner with degenerative disc disease and
degenerative arthritis found in both the 1988 X-ray and the 1983
X-ray.

(R. 25). The ALJ noted that Dr. Kotrady found no acute

changes in Petitioner's condition from 1983 to 1988.

(R. 25).

In addition to Dr. Kotrady's diagnosis, the ALJ noted that the
Castleview Hospital records refer to extensive degenerative
arthritis in the lumbar spine and show no acute herniations or
fractures in the X-ray and no changes from the 1983 X-ray.
(R. 26).
The ALJ found Dr. Gaufin's medical records
contradictory because he diagnosed extensive degenerative
arthritic changes yet he indicated that one-half of Petitioner's
impairment was due to the April 15, 1988 incident.

(R. 26). The

ALJ noted that Dr. Gaufin did not have access to Petitioner's
prior medical records and that Dr. Gaufin found that Petitioner
was unable to work because of a severe degenerative process of
the lumbar spine.

(R. 26). The ALJ also pointed out that Dr.

Heiner also did not have access to Petitioner's prior medical
records and that neither Dr. Heiner nor Dr. Gaufin explained how
they arrived at their impairment ratings.

Finally, the ALJ

questioned the basis of Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's impairment
ratings.

The only evidence of these ratings were brief notations
11

on fill-in-the-blank forms which were prepared by Petitioner's
counsel.

(R. 26) . The Commission held that, since the doctors'

conclusions were based on incomplete information, they could be
discounted and did not constitute credible medical evidence.
(R. 73).
The ALJ concluded that there was "no confirmation of
contribution from the work activities of April 15, 1988," and
that Petitioner's need for treatment and any disability after
April 15, 1988, were the result of his long-standing, preexisting
degenerative back condition.

(R. 25, 26).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner seeks permanent total disability benefits
for osteoarthritis in his back, based upon a claimed event which
he has been unable to consistently describe.

He has

long-standing back problems and was diagnosed with severe
degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine and degenerative
disc disease five years before this alleged accident.
Petitioner's condition is not compensable because it was not
caused by his activities at work.

The ALJ and the Commission

found that Petitioner's disability was due to his pre-existing
condition, severe degenerative osteoarthritis, and that his work
activities on April 15, 1988 were not the medical cause of his
disability.

When reviewing a factual finding of medical
12

causation the proper standard of review is whether substantial
evidence supports the finding.

The ALJ and the Commission's

finding of no medical causation is supported by substantial
evidence, based on the testimony given at the hearing and a
review of the medical records.
In order to have a factual finding overturned on
appeal, the Petitioner must marshal the evidence and show that
the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial
evidence.

In this case, Petitioner has not marshaled the

evidence supporting the findings of the Commission and the ALJ,
nor has he shown that there is not substantial evidence
supporting the determinations.

Therefore, this Court must defer

to the unchallenged factual findings of the ALJ and the
Commission.
The Commission applied the correct standard of proof to
the findings of fact.

Petitioner argues that the ALJ held that

Petitioner's work activities must "significantly" contribute to
his pre-existing conditions in order for the condition to be
compensable.

Petitioner's argument is irrelevant because it is

the Commission's order and not the ALJ's order which is on review
to this Court and Petitioner does not claim that the Commission
applied the wrong standard of proof.

In addition, Petitioner's

argument is wrong because, as the Commission found, the ALJ used
13

the proper standard.

She found that Petitioner's disability was

due to a pre-existing condition and that there was no
confirmation of contributions from his April 15, 1988 work
activities.
Petitioner argues that the ALJ abused her discretion by
not referring this matter to a medical panel.

Referral to a

medical panel, however, is not mandatory but is in the discretion
of the ALJ and the Commission.

In this case, the ALJ and the

Commission examined the evidence and determined that there was no
credible evidence of medical causation and, therefore, no reason
to refer the matter to a medical panel.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS BECAUSE HIS DISABILITY IS THE RESULT OF SEVERE
DEGENERATIVE OSTEOARTHRITIS AND WAS NOT CAUSED BY HIS WORK
ACTIVITIES.
A.

The Petition Should be Dismissed Because Petitioner has
Failed to Marshal the Evidence and Refute the Factual
Finding of no Medical Causation.
Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that his disability was caused by an industrial
accident.

Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956.

(Utah App. 1988) .3

In order to receive workers 7 compensation

Petitioner tries to circumvent his burden of proof by
arguing that the Workers Compensation Act should be liberally
construed. Liberal construction does not, however,, relieve
Petitioner from the requirement of proving all elements of his
14

benefits, Petitioner must prove that an industrial accident was
the medical cause of his disability.

"The medical causation

requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage fraudulent claims."
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 26-27 (Utah App.
1986).

In this case, Petitioner failed to prove medical

causation.

(R. 26). The ALJ and the Commission found that

Petitioner's back condition was due to degenerative
osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease with no proof of
contribution from the April 15, 1988 industrial incident.
(R. 26, 77).
In order to overturn the findings of the Commission,
Petitioner must first marshal the evidence supporting the
Commission's finding and then show that the finding is not
supported by substantial evidence.
68.

Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at

In Grace Drilling, this Court explained the application of

the substantial evidence test for reviewing findings of fact:
claim by a preponderance of the evidence, including medical
causation. If he fails to meet his burden of proof his claim
must be denied. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
709 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court of Utah stated
"[w]hile disability claims are liberally construed in favor of
awarding benefits . . . we do not overturn the Commission's
findings unless they are arbitrary or capricious, wholly without
cause, contrary to the one inevitable conclusion from the
evidence or without substantial evidence to support them."
Petitioner's argument at p.11 of his brief that he is entitled to
have all factual doubts resolved in his favor is flatly wrong.
15

[i]t is also important to note that the
'whole record test' necessarily requires that
a party challenging the Board's findings of
fact must marshal[] all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. Id.
This Court also stated in Grace Drilling that: "[i]n undertaking
such a review, this court will not substitute its judgment as
between two reasonable conflicting views, even though we may have
come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de
novo review."

Id. , and:

" [i]t is the province of the Board, not

appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it
is for the Board to draw the inferences."

Id., citing Board of

Educ. of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186,
1193 (1985).
Petitioner has failed to even attempt to marshal the
evidence in this case and, therefore, has not and cannot
challenge the Commission's finding of no medical causation.
Instead of marshaling the evidence, Petitioner merely makes
general statements in his Brief such as:

"The evidence that

petitioner suffered an industrial injury...is overwhelming," and
"both of the examining doctors assign one-half of the
petitioner's injuries to the industrial accident."
16

These general

statements do nothing to show the facts supporting the
Commission's decision, and do not amount to marshaling the
evidence.

In Johnson v. Board of Review, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at

68, this Court found that a party who challenges the Commission's
findings of fact must marshal all the evidence in support of
those findings and show that those findings are not supported by
substantial .evidence.
Petitioner does not show that the Commission's findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioner does not

address Dr. Kotrady's findings nor does he address the ALJ's
findings regarding Drs. Gaufin and Heiner.

Dr. Gaufin and Dr.

Heiner both diagnosed degenerative osteoarthritis, yet neither
doctor explained how the April 15, 1988 incidents contributed to
or caused Petitioner's degenerative condition.

Additionally,

Petitioner provides no credible medical evidence explaining how
the hip pain he suffered in April 15, 1988 aggravated his
degenerative back disease.

Finally, Petitioner does not explain

the conflicting reports of what actually occurred on April 15,
1988 and does not explain why there is no mention of the screen
jerking incident in the record until the hearing.
Petitioner claims that he was unable to marshal the
evidence because the ALJ's findings of fact were "grossly
inadequate."

The ALJ's findings of fact, however, are clearly in
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line with the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1
(Utah App. 1991)•

Adams requires findings by the ALJ which

"indicate respectively (1) the issues decided, .... (2) the legal
interpretation and applications made...and (3) the subsidiary
factual findings in support of the decision....

Xd. at 6.

In this case, (1) the ALJ found that Petitioner did not
injure his back on April 15, 1988 at work and that Petitioner's
April 15, 1988 work activities did not cause Petitioner's
disability.

(2) The ALJ applied the law that compensation will

be awarded only when the industrial incident is the medical cause
of the disability for which compensation is sought.

(3) She

supported her decision by reviewing the descriptions of the
April 15, 1988 events in the record, by referring to the
substance of all the doctors' medical records, and by resolving
the factual discrepancies in the testimony and the medical
records.

She found, based in part on 1983 x-rays, that

Petitioner had a severe degenerative condition which preexisted
April 15, 1988.

(R. 26.)

She pointed to specifics in Dr.

Kotrady's medical records and in Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's
medical records.4

(R. 25, 26). She found that Dr., Kotrady was

Petitioner argues that the ALJ casually disregarded
Dr. Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's ratings. On the contrary, the ALJ
found that the fill-in-the-blanks forms were not reliable because
the doctors did not explain the basis for the ratings and did not
have access to Petitioner's prior medical records. Moreover, she
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clearly of the opinion that the Petitioner's problems were
preexisting and that he was unable to answer a definitive "yes"
to whether the industrial injury caused the symptoms.

(R. 25).

In addition, she found that there were no acute changes in
Petitioner's x-rays from 1983-1988 and that Dr. Gaufin, Dr.
Heiner and Dr. Kotrady all found that Petitioner had a severe
degenerative back condition.

(R. 25, 26.)

In addition to the ALJ's findings, the Commission's
findings were also quite specific.

The Commission emphasized

that the treating physician on April 15, 1988 (Dr. Kotrady) "was
clearly of the opinion that the applicant's medical problems were
preexisting."

(R. 106.)

The Commission noted that the

Castleview records refer to severe degenerative osteoarthritis
and that the x-ray readings in 1983 and 1988 were "remarkably
similar."

(R. 106.)

The Commission also noted that Dr. Gaufin

and Dr. Heiner's fill-in-the-blank forms could be discounted
because the doctors did not have access to Petitioner's prior
medical records when they completed them.

(R. 107.)

The ALJ's

Order and the Commission's Order each set out and explain
specific facts and how those facts lead to the conclusion that

stated that Dr. Gaufin's rating seemed to contradict his
diagnosis. (R. 26).
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Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving medical
causation.
B.

The Aggravation of a Preexisting Condition is
Compensable Only if it is a Permanent, Ratable
Aggravation.
Despite his failure to marshal the evidence, and

despite that the Commission found no evidence of aggravation,
Petitioner argues that his work activities on April 15, 1988
aggravated his preexisting condition and, therefore, that his
injury is compensable.

Petitioner cites Powers v. Industrial

Commission, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah 1967), for the proposition
that "the aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by
an industrial accident is compensable. . . . "

Petitioner's

argument that "any aggravation" is compensable is unfounded.
In Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah
App. 1990), this Court held that an aggravation of a preexisting
condition is not compensable if it is a temporary aggravation or
a non-ratable acceleration of symptoms.

Xd.

Only a permanent,

ratable aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable.
Id.
In Virgin, the petitioner was injured at work when a
support chain broke and an automobile engine hit him in the left
hip and knocked him down.

lei. at 1285.

The petitioner sought

review of the Commission's Order denying workers' compensation
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benefits.

The Commission concluded that there was no causal

connection between petitioner's injury and the hip replacement
surgery for which he sought compensation.

Id.

About fourteen

months after the accident, petitioner went to see an orthopedic
surgeon who concluded that petitioner had aseptic necrosis of the
left hip and, to a lesser degree, of the right hip.

The

orthopedic surgeon concluded that this was probably caused by
alcoholism and recommended a hip replacement.

Id.

Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits for
the hip replacement claiming that his hip condition was
aggravated by the industrial accident.

The ALJ appointed a

medical panel of one orthopedic surgeon who concluded "I think
perhaps it happened sooner than it would have had he not had an
injury, but I feel he would have ultimately needed surgery on
this in spite of any industrial injury. . . . "

Id. at 1286. The

ALJ found that the industrial accident permanently aggravated
petitioner's preexisting condition and thus was causally
connected to his hip replacement.

The Commission reviewed the

case and overturned the ALJ's order and findings.

Id.

On review to this Court, the petitioner argued that
because the Medical Panel found that the industrial accident
aggravated his preexisting condition, his hip replacement was
compensable.

Id. at 1287. This Court held that petitioner's
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injury was not ci ratable permanent aggravation of his preexisting
condition and, therefore, was not compensable.

Id. at 1289.

As with Virgin, this case involves the alleged
aggravation of a preexisting condition.

There is no credible

medical evidence that Petitioner's condition was permanently
aggravated by his April 15 work activities.

Indeed, substantial

evidence shows, instead, that Petitioner's disability is due to
severe degenerative arthritis and degenerative disc disease.5
This case is also analogous to Giesbrecht v. Board of
Review, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah App. 1992).

In Giesbrecht, this Court

addressed the "direction of medical causality" and held that in
order to be compensable, the injury at work must aggravate the
preexisting condition.

Id. at 547.

fractured his femur at work.

In Giesbrecht, the applicant

He discovered cancer in the bone

and sought worker's compensation.

.Id. at 545-546.

This Court

found that while the cancer may have aggravated the femur
Petitioner briefly states that the Commission should have
looked at Petitioner's entire employment history with Beaver
Creek Coal Co. in determining whether he suffered a compensable
injury. It is unclear what Petitioner is trying to argue.
Petitioner cites cases which deal with legal causation, which is
not at issue in this appeal. Any inference that the effects of a
life-time of living and working is automatically compensable as
an industrial accident is wholly unsupported and goes against the
purpose and intent of workers' compensation laws. Finally,
Petitioner made a claim only for an alleged industrial accident
on April 15, 1988. To now claim in alternative that perhaps his
problems were caused by repetitive motion is not .supported in the
record and was not properly raised below.
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fracture, in order to recover, the applicant had to prove the
reverse:

"that the femur fracture contributed to, accelerated,

or aggravated the cancer."

Id.

Since there was no evidence it

did, denial of compensation was affirmed.

(R. A-2 at 9.)

In this case, Dr. Kotrady stated that Petitioner's hip
pain was possibly caused by compensating for his back problem by
shifting his weight to his hips.

However, there is certainly

nothing to support that Petitioner's hip problem contributed to
or aggravated his back problem, and therefore, his disability is
not compensable.
II.

THE COMMISSION AND THE ALJ APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF
PROOF TO PETITIONER'S CLAIM.
A.

It is the Commission's Order which is on Review and The
Commission Applied the Correct Standard of Proof to
Petitioner's Claim.
Petitioner argues that the ALJ applied the incorrect

standard of proof because, in her Order, she stated that
Petitioner's symptoms "were not the result of any significant
contribution by the activities of April 15, 1988."

Petitioner

construes this to mean that the ALJ found that work activities
must significantly contribute to a preexisting condition in order
to be compensable.

However, Petitioner ignores other language in

the ALJ's Order and the analysis made by the Commission in its
Order.
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The Commission applied the correct standard and it is the
Commission's Order which is being reviewed by this Court.

In

Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App.
1987), this Court stated that a decision by the Commission "which
finally disposes of a proper motion for review is a final order
subject to review only by timely appeal to the Court of Appeals."
As it is the Commission's order which is being reviewed, whether
the ALJ applied the wrong standard is irrelevant as long as the
Commission did not apply the wrong standard.

In its Order the

Commission stated that the ALJ "did not use the standard alleged"
by Petitioner.

(R. 107). The Commission found that the ALJ did

not apply a significant contribution standard and, therefore, it
follows that the Commission did not apply a significant
contribution standard in affirming the ALJ's order.
B.

The ALJ Applied the Correct Standard of Proof to
Petitioner's Claim.
The ALJ did use the language "significant contribution"

but, it is apparent from the Orders of both the ALJ and the
Commission that the ALJ did not apply that standard.

As noted

above, the Commission found that the ALJ did not apply a
"significant contribution" standard regarding aggravation of a
preexisting injury:
. . . it appears that the ALJ determined that
the applicant's treatment on April 15, 1988
had nothing to do with his work, and resulted
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entirely from his pre-existing condition with
no contribution from his work place labor.
(R. 107). The ALJ specifically stated that Petitioner's
preexisting condition was the cause of his need for treatment
with "no confirmation of contribution from the work activities of
April 15, 1988."

(R. 25). The ALJ found that there was no

contribution from the April 15 work events and did not need to
address the question of what degree of aggravation was
compensable since there was no aggravation.5
III.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL BECAUSE IT WAS
ABLE TO MAKE THE DETERMINATION REGARDING MEDICAL CAUSATION
ON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT.
A.

The Commission did not need to Refer this Matter to a
Medical Panel Because there was no Credible Evidence of
Medical Causation.
Failure to refer to a medical panel cannot be an abuse

of discretion when there is no credible evidence of medical
causation.

Plaintiff would have the Commission convene a medical

panel so he can try to prove his case at state expense, but
medical panels should not be used to fill in the gaps in

Petitioner also argues that the ALJ applied a "clear and
convincing" standard rather than a preponderance of the evidence
standard to the issue of causation, but the ALJ specifically used
the term "preponderance of medical evidence." (R. 26). She used
the term "clearly" in dicta only when referring to legal
causation not medical causation. She was not applying a clear
and convincing standard but merely saying that if she had reached
the issue of legal causation it is not "clear" that Petitioner's
work activities could be classified as "unusual exertion." The
ALJ did not reach the issue of legal causation because the
finding of no medical causation is dispositive.
25

Petitioner's case.

In Workers' Comp. Fund v. Industrial

Commission, 761 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah App. 1988), this Court stated
in response to an argument that failure to refer to a medical
panel was an abuse of discretion, "we cannot say that the
administrative law judge abused his discretion in not referring
this case to a medical panel when there was medical evidence to
support his finding of medical causation."

It follows that there

is no requirement to refer to a medical panel when there is
evidence of no causation and certainly when there is no credible
evidence of medical causation.
There is ample medical evidence to support the ALJ's
finding of no medical causation.

Petitioner presented only two

fill-in-the-blank forms from doctors who did not have access to
his prior medical records.

(R. 26, 107.)

The doctors did not

review Petitioner's 1983 X-rays and therefore did not see that
there were no acute changes from the 1983 X-rays to the 1988
X-rays.

The doctors rated Petitioner in September, 1988, and

stated, without explanation, that 50% of the impairment was due
to the accident only a few months before.

There is no indication

that the ratings were based on the AMA guidelines.

(R. 46, 60).

The ALJ relied on Dr. Kotrady's medical records which state that
Petitioner's condition was caused by his preexisting, severe
degenerative osteoarthritis of the back and degenerative
arthritis of both hips.

(R. A-2 at 9).
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Dr. Kotrady first saw

Petitioner on April 15, 1988, and diagnosed Petitioner with the
benefit of Petitionees prior medical records.
B.

Referral to a Medical Panel is Discretionary.
Petitioner puts much emphasis on the fact that Dr.

Gaufin's and Dr. Heiner's impairment ratings differed by more
than 5% and argues that R490-1-9 of the Utah Administrative Code
mandates reference to a medical panel in this situation.

This

argument puts the cart before the horse because the ALJ and the
Commission found no credible evidence of medical causation and,
therefore, any conflict over impairment ratings is irrelevant.
Permanent partial disability ratings are not at issue in this
case because the Commission found no credible evidence of medical
causation and, therefore, no medical dispute.
Reference to a medical panel is, in any event,
discretionary.

Utah Code Ann. 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) states:

Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury by accident, or for death, arising
out of and in the course of employment, and
if the employer or its insurance carrier
denies liability, the commission may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the commission. (Emphasis
added.)
The above statute makes referral to a medical panel
discretionary; the Commission may appoint a medical panel but is
not required to do so.

In Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008,

1012 (Utah 198 6), the Utah Supreme Court stated "reference to the
medical panel is controlled by statute.
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In 1982, the legislature

amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and changed the requirement of
mandatory referral to the medical panel to permissive referral."
Id.
Despite the above statute and case law, Petitioner
argues that R490-1-9 mandates referral to a medical panel.
Regulation 490-1-9, however, simply sets out guidelines and
cannot be construed as mandatory for a number of reasons.

The

first reason that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as mandatory is
that the legislature intended referral to a medical panel to be
discretionary.

The legislature specifically changed reference to

a medical panel from mandatory to discretionary.

Before it was

amended, U.C.A. 35-1-77 (1953) said:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury or by accident or for death
arising out of or in the course of employment
and where the employer or insurance carrier
denies liability, the commission shall refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the commission. . . ..
(Emphasis added.)
In 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and
changed the shall refer to a medical panel to may refer to a
medical panel.

Hone, 778 P.2d at 1012.

R490-1-9 cannot be read

to circumvent legislative intent.
The second reason that the Regulation cannot be
construed as mandatory is that, if it were mandatory, it would be
void as beyond the scope of U.C.A. § 35-1-77 (1988).

The word

"may11 in § 35-1-77 indicates that it is discretionary and,
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therefore, it cannot be made mandatory by a regulation.

In

Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah
App. 1988) this Court stated:
An administrative agency's authority to
promulgate regulations is limited to those
regulations which are consonant with the
statutory framework, and neither contrary to
the statute or beyond its scope.
Any regulation which makes referral to a medical panel mandatory
is not consistent with and goes beyond the scope of U.C.A.
§ 35-1-77 and is therefore void.
The final reason that R490-1-9 cannot be construed as
mandatory is that the ALJ can disregard the finding of the
medical panel in light of other evidence.
(1988)

U.C.A. § 35-1-77(2)(d)

states:
The commission may base its findings and
decisions on the report of the panel, medical
director, or medical consultants, but is not
bound by the report if other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.

In Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Wallace. 728 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1988)
the Supreme Court of Utah found that the Commission can reject
the finding of the medical panel and rely on other evidence in
the record.

Also, in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller,

657 P.2d 1367, 1371-1372 (1983), the Supreme Court of Utah upheld
the Commission's finding regarding medical causation despite the
fact that the medical panel made contrary findings.
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The

Pittsburg Testing Court relied on other medical evidence and
rejected the medical panel report.

Id.

If an ALJ determines that there is no evidence of
medical causation and that it is unnecessary to refer a case to a
medical panel, then it would be illogical to require her to do so
in light of the fact that she could rely on other medical
evidence and disregard the findings of the medical panel.

It

would also be a costly waste of State resources to require
reference of every single matter to a medical panel when the ALJ
is able to make a determination without the assistance of a
panel.

Petitioner essentially argues for mandating referral to a

panel every time a petitioner loses on medical causation.

This

is contrary to the 1982 amendment to U.C.A. § 35-1-77, and to the
spirit of the case law, Champion Home Builders, 703 P.2d at 308,
and should not be permitted.

The Commission did not abuse its

discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Beaver Creek respectfully
requests that this Court deny Petitioner's Petition for Review.
The February 18, 1992 order of the Industrial Commission should
be affirmed because substantial evidence shows that Petitioner's
disability is due to a preexisting condition and is not related
to his April 15, 1988 work activities.

The ALJ reviewed the

medical records, heard Petitioner's testimony and made a factual
determination as to the events that occurred and the lack of
30

proof of medical causation.

The Industrial Commission's order

should be affirmed.
DATED this

J

y*
day of January, 1993.
RAY, QUINNEY, & NEBEKER

Steven J. -Aeschbacher

Attorneys for Beaver Creek
Coal Co. and Cigna Insurance
Co.
6163.01/gsa
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I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Petitioner were hand delivered on the 5th day
of January, 1993, to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals (1 original and 7 copies)
4 00 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Virginius Dabney (2 copies)
DABNEY SL DABNEY
Attorneys for Petitioner
350 South 400 East, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. (2 copies)
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 South 300 East
P. O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. (2 copies)
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND
P. O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys for Respondent
Beaver Creek Coal Co. and
Cigna Insurance Co.
6163.01/gsa
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A:

Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-77 and 6346(b)-16
Utah Administrative Code R490-1-9

Exhibit B:

Summary Medical Record Form - Dr. Lynn M. Gaufin

Exhibit C:

Summary Medical Record Form - Dr. David R. Heiner
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R490-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical
Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize
an injured worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing
these medical issues in all cases where:

1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further
medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

Exhibit "A

35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or
medical consultants — Discretionary
authority of commission to refer case
— Findings and reports — Objections
to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury by accident, or for death, arising out of
or in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability,
the commission may refer the medical aspects of
the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission. The panel shall have the qualifications
generally applicable to the medical panel under
Section 35-2-56.
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an
impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in
its sole discretion may employ a medical director
or medical consultants on a full-time or part-time
basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding responsibility. If
all parties agree to the use of a medical director
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to
function in the same manner and under the same
procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultants shall make such study, take
such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the
commission, as it may determine to be necessary
or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultants shall make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may require.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute
full copies of the report to the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered
mail with return receipt requested. Within 15

Exhibit

days after the report is deposited in the United
States post office, the applicant, the employer, or
its insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written
objections are filed within that period, the report
is considered admitted in evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and
decision on the report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the com, mission may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the medical
panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the hearing for examination
and cross-examination. For good cause shown,
the commission may order other members of the
panel, with or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to be present
at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
(0 The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as
an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is
sustained by the testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
isss
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

E x h i b i t "A

(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency lias acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, lass
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REGARDING AN INDUSTRIAL INJURY

TO:

Dr. David R. Heiner

Kerry LeRoy Willardso
Applicant
Date of Injury 04/15/00
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Has Applicant a permanent impairment due t o the industrial injury?
i f so, vfoat i s the percent of impairment fabole bcdy) ?
/<r°/+

6.

Has Appli
injury?

7.

Was the industrial injury aggravated by airy pre-e>dsting condition
vas any pre-existing condition aggravated by the jjrhistrial injury?

When?

a permanent iifpairmmt WbicH existed before h i s industrial
; i f so, vfoat i s the percent of impairment ft&ole bodvli? JfS^X

Dated t h i s I *f

day of

, QjU^/lyfin bpf,

19 <^T. /'>

**tt

Riysidi^n's Signature
AIZIB3RIZATIOK TOR KETiTftSE OF MEDICAL IKFUEMAITCN
I hereby authorize and request you to release to my attorneys, DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C., the above requested medical information concerning my medical
history, physical condition, prognoses and treatment rendered fcy ycu to me.
IF THERE IS ANY CHARSE INVOLVED IN FR3VIDINS THE REQUESTED INK2RMA110N, PLEASE
FORWARD A RTTL FOR SUCH SERVICE DIRECTLY TO ME (SHE PATIENT).

U

^t£^/aAr&2*^

itient's Signature

'03J

SWORN to before me this 1 ^ day of/QipUdUaJ^My#

<^ffi

, 23^5 .

Notary-'7 P^slic
fcslic Residing in:. „
O'

NPI^y ftfttoo^ ^ y questions to above law firm, not Ufaih Industrial Commission!
'4 TE O'

000(
Exhibit "C"

